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Abstract 
This paper examines the roles played by rural religious groups in China’s local 
contentious politics. More specifically, it aims to explore whether religious groups 
stimulate or reduce collective contention when the ruler is both authoritarian and atheist. 
Drawing on national survey data and comparative case studies, this paper finds that 
collective contention is less likely to occur in villages with religious groups that 
simultaneously overlap with secular social organisations and local authorities and are 
hence more likely to serve as credible communication channels between local states 
and discontent citizens. This finding highlights two issues that are often side-lined, if 
not outright neglected, in the existing literature: First, the relationship between religious 
groups and collective contention is diverse rather than uniform. Second, this 
relationship is shaped not only by religious groups but also by other important players 
in the local political arena. 
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Introduction 
Religious groups are powerful social forces; in addition to shaping people’s daily lives, 
they also frequently engage in many issues often considered to be ‘secular’, including 
elections, political campaigns, and national identity building (Broughton and ten Napel 
2000; Limaye et al. 2004; van der Veer and Lehmann 1999). Even China – a country 
ruled by an authoritarian and atheist regime – has witnessed a great wave of religious 
revival since the state lifted the total ban religious groups in 1982 (e.g. Ying 2006; Lai 
2003). Today, despite the strict restrictions, religious groups are playing active roles in 
China; in fact, given the limited freedom of association, these groups are among the 
country’s most resilient social organisations (Dean 2003; Tsai 2007). This paper 
examines the roles played by rural religious groups in China’s local contentious politics. 
More specifically, it aims to explore whether religious groups stimulate or reduce 
collective contention and to make sense of the underlying mechanisms involved in such 
issues. 
Although reports on state vs. religion conflicts in China are not rare (e.g. Wong 
2001; Tong 2009), there is yet to be a comprehensive and systematic examination of 
the actual roles of religious groups in China’s contentious politics. This paper intends 
to serve as the first step in bridging this gap by studying original data and cases collected 
from rural China. In so doing, it hopes to engage with, and contribute to, the ongoing 
theoretical debates as to whether religious groups increase or decrease collective 
contention. According to the empirical findings, overall the occurrence of collective 
contention appears to exhibit no significant difference between villages with different 
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amounts of religious groups; however, collective contention is less likely to occur in 
villages with religious groups that simultaneously overlap with secular social 
organisations and local authorities. Such findings highlight two issues that are often 
side-lined, if not outright neglected, in the existing literature. First, the relationship 
between religious groups and collective contention is diverse rather than uniform. 
Second, this relationship is shaped not only by religious groups but also by other 
important players in the local political arena. To elaborate on these findings, the rest of 
this paper first reviews the relevant theoretical debates and operationalises the 
competing arguments into two hypotheses. It then examines both hypotheses against 
representative survey data from rural China and finds that neither holds. A new 
explanatory framework is thus raised to decompose the heterogeneous association 
between religious groups and collective contention, suggesting that religious groups 
with different relational statuses may play different roles in contentious politics. This 
new framework is subsequently verified through statistical tests. The paper concludes 
with a brief discussion on its theoretical contributions and practical implications. 
 
Theoretical Debates 
The roles of religious groups in contentious politics have long been studied; however, 
despite the rich literature in this field, no clear consensus has been reached. While 
religious groups have been widely regarded as socio-political tools of control, used by 
the rulers to suppress collective contention, as Trejo (2009) notes, ‘one of the most 
consistent and surprising’ social scientific findings in recent years is the religious 
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origins of some of the most powerful secular social and political movements. The 
theoretical debates on the relationship between religious groups and collective 
contention are thus still ongoing. While many theorists suggest that religious groups 
help to maintain social stability, acting as tranquillisers that reduce the likelihood of 
collective contention, others argue that religious groups frequently challenge existing 
social orders, serving as agitators that stimulate collective contention. 
Scholars who view religious groups as tranquillisers believe that these groups can 
discourage conflicts either by blurring the differences between different social groups 
or reducing people’s awareness of them. Marx (1977), for example, famously claimed 
that religion served as the ‘opium of the people’. Although there are divergences as to 
what Marx actually intended by drawing the comparison, it is generally agreed that he 
accused religion of reducing people’s awareness of class conflict and suppressing 
people’s willingness to engage in class struggle by providing them with a ‘fantastic 
realisation of the human essence’ that ‘has not acquired any true reality’. Similarly, in 
his discussions of the theodicy of good fortune and misfortune, Weber indicates that 
religion and religious groups can ‘mollify those at the bottom of the social structure’ 
and thus ‘sanctify the status quo’ (Pyle and Davidson 1998). In addition, Stark (1972) 
suggests that the aspects of faith that serve as a relief for suffering are more likely to 
attract the poor, while Pope (1942) and Howe (1981) argue that the wealthy and 
powerful are able to control and manipulate belief systems, often appropriating 
religious ideas to legitimate existing social structures. In addition, many scholars 
consider religious groups as important sources of social trust (e.g. Smidt 1999; Veenstra 
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2002; Wuthnow 2002; Welch et al. 2004) and thus contributors towards democracy 
(Putnam et al. 1994), social integration (Inglehart 1997), prosperity, and social harmony 
(Fukuyama 1995). These theories give rise to the following hypothesis: Religious 
groups in contemporary rural China correlate negatively with collective contention: 
other things being equal, the more religious groups in a sample village, the lower the 
likelihood of collective contention [Hypothesis 1]. 
The aforementioned view, however, has recently come under increasing fire. 
Many researchers argue that religious groups actually agitate rather than tranquillise 
collective contention, offering three explanations for this finding. Firstly, religious 
doctrines and values do not always perpetuate the status quo; instead, they may ‘serve 
a prophetic function, promoting social action to redress society’s ills’ (Pyle and 
Davidson 1998). For example, Lam (2006), Morris (1986), and Woodberry and Shah 
(2004) all argue that the participatory and civic attitudes embedded in Protestantism 
make Protestants more likely to engage with collective contention. Similarly, Nepstad 
(2004) demonstrates how some Christian clergy skillfully employ religious rituals, 
stories of martyrs, and biblical teachings to establish a link between faith and activism, 
while many scholars find that the ‘liberation theology’ contributed much to pro-
democratic protests in and beyond Latin America (e.g. Adriance 1986; Neal 1987; 
Berryman 1987). Second, religious groups may cause or reinforce a so-called clash of 
civilisations and the associated or underlying socio-political conflicts. Huntington 
(1996) argues that the primary axis of conflict in the post-Cold-War world falls not 
along ideological or economic lines but cultural and religious ones, and his thesis is 
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supported by empirical evidence drawn from across the globe, including Southeast Asia 
(Searle 2002; Houben 2003), South Asia (Cady and Simon 2006; Gould 2011), the 
Middle East (Baumgartner et al. 2008), Africa (Ukiwo 2003; Ellis and Haar 2004) and 
the Balkan Peninsula (Bax 2000). Lastly, religious groups may provide organisational 
structures and personnel for collective contention. Empirical research in Eastern Europe 
and the Arabic world demonstrate that powerful collective protests that eventually 
overthrew the ruling order often benefitted from pre-existing organisations and the 
leadership of religious groups (Salehi 1988; Osa 1996). These theories imply an 
alternative hypothesis: Religious groups in contemporary rural China correlate 
positively with collective contention: other things being equal, the more religious 
groups in a sample village, the higher the likelihood of collective contention 
[Hypothesis 2]. 
 
Data and the Initial Test 
Contemporary China is an ideal setting to test the competing theories summarised in 
the previous section thanks to its richness and diverseness of both religious groups and 
collective contention (Cai 2010; Goossaert and Palmer 2011; Yang 2012). To 
systematically study religious groups and collective contention in rural China, working 
with colleagues I conducted a national survey covering 119 sampled villages (in 59 
townships, 30 counties, and six provinces) selected through a stratified random 
sampling strategy in 2008. In addition to information on religious groups and collective 
contention in each sample village, the data also cover a list of demographic, 
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socioeconomic, and political indictors, allowing us to better understand the background 
situations of our sample. 1  Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample 
villages. 
Table 1 is here. 
Based on the original survey data, Hypotheses 1 and 2, which share the same 
independent and dependent variables but vary in the direction of the correlation, are 
tested through the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model.2 
IfCCi=α+NRGiβ+CViγ+TDiθ+μi   [A] 
In Model A, IfCC is the dependent variable, which refers to occurrences of 
collective contention involving 30 or more participants in the sample village since 2000; 
NRG is the independent variable, which refers to the ‘number of religious groups’ in a 
sampled village; CV refers to a vector of controls; TD refers to the township-level 
dummy variables; α is the intercept; β is the coefficient of NRG; γ is the coefficient of 
CV; θ is the coefficient of TD; μ is the residual error of the model; and i is the village 
code. 3 The set of controls, which are the same in all models, include ten variables 
measuring the capability of local authorities, the incentives of village cadres, the quality 
of village elections, the extent and frequency of land requisition, and the geographic, 
demographic, and economic backgrounds of the sample.4 The set of township-level 
dummy variables are included to ensure that comparisons are actually made within each 
pair of the sampled villages in the same township. In so doing, it is possible to eliminate 
the impacts that cultural traditions or local government policies have on collective 
contention, which are otherwise difficult to control for. 
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Table 2 is here. 
The statistical results of Model A are reported in Table 2. The insignificant 
coefficient of the independent variable suggests that the occurrence of collective 
contention appear to be on the same level in villages with and without religious groups. 
That is to say, neither of the two hypotheses formed from the established theories holds 
true against the empirical survey data. A new framework is thus necessary for 
understanding the actual relationship between religious groups and collective 
contention in rural China. 
 
The Diverse Roles of Religious Groups in Contentious Politics 
The insignificant statistical results in Table 2 could be interpreted as implying that 
religious groups and collective contention are not related to each other in rural China. 
However, my field experience suggests that at least some groups are closely associated 
with collective contention in a way or another. Moreover, while religious uprising may 
only form a very tiny proportion of the collective contention in contemporary China,5 
it is not uncommon for religious groups – the most resilient independent social 
organisations in the country – to get involved in contentious politics triggered by non-
religious issues (Liu et al. 2010). To understand the apparent mismatch among the 
theories, the statistical results, and my field experience, more attention should be paid 
to the special features of collective contention in authoritarian countries like China. 
The Pathology of Collective Contention in Authoritarian Countries 
The skyrocketing increase of collective contention in China is widely regarded as a 
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result of the public anger and grievance fuelled by corruption and government failures 
(O'Brien 2002a). While such an observation appears compelling, on its own it fails to 
explain two features of China’s collective contention. For one, corruption and rent-
seeking seem inevitable due to the absence of effective institutional arrangements 
against the abuse of power (Lü 2000; Sun 2004), so these problems are ubiquitous 
across China (Manion 2004). Collective contention, however, is distributed quite 
unequally across different localities (Thornton 2012; Hurst 2004). In addition, 
collective contention often starts from trivial events that could happen anywhere, and 
participants of collective contention do not always have a clear picture of the events 
that triggered the entire episode (Liu et al. 2010). 
The solution to such a puzzle, I suggest, emerges when we follow Melucci (1989) 
by shifting attention from why collective contention occurs to how they occurs. 
Grievances are prevalent among citizens in many societies (Oberschall 1978; McCarthy 
and Zald 1977), but only under some circumstances can they trigger collective 
contention. In democracies, the mandates of governments are granted through elections, 
and citizens can express their grievances through votes. Facing the pressure of an 
election, politicians have to pay serious attention to citizens’ claims. As a result, 
negotiation channels between the state and society are generally sufficient and efficient, 
and citizens find it relatively easy to express their grievances through institutionalised 
means.6 Moreover, the boundary between contained and transgressive behaviours is 
normally explicit and credible in democracies thanks to the rule of law, so citizens are 
less likely to participate in collective contention when they have legitimate channels 
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through which to express positions and demands. Officials in autocracies and 
authoritarian regimes, however, often turn a blind eye to people’s grievances since their 
power normally comes from above (Bendix 1977). Absolute autocracies can still 
maintain stability through strict social controls (Lau 1990), but authoritarian countries 
like contemporary China are particular vulnerable to collective contention because their 
citizens often use the rights granted by the constitution and laws as weapons of ‘rightful 
resistance’ (O'Brien and Li 2006).7 Moreover, due to the unclear and unstable boundary 
between contained and transgressive contention, authoritarian states have to face the 
constant risk that ‘more concessions beget more contention’ (O'Brien 2002b). 
Dealing with such problems is not a straightforward matter in authoritarian 
countries, as the leading newspapers and TV channels – typical sources of credible 
information in democracies – are controlled by the state, such that ‘more reliance is 
place on oral and unofficial means of communications’ (Fandy 2000). Moreover, the 
recent commercialisation of media in China has provided more space for journalists to 
‘push the envelope of what the regime considers off-limits by investigating stories 
about local corruption and abuses of power’ (Nathan 2003). Therefore, the news media 
in China today, as Chen and Shi (2001) argue, have ‘negative effects on people's 
attitudes toward political institutions in general’ and ‘make people distrust government’. 
Lacking credible communications, misperceptions between the state and the society, 
which are fuelled by widespread rumours, can easily make trivial incidents into triggers 
of collective contention (Liu et al. 2010). Moreover, without effective channels of 
communication, discontented citizens and the government find it impossible to credibly 
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and explicitly demonstrate their true position and the price they are willing to pay to 
defend them. Under such circumstances, mutual agreements are hard to reach and 
collective contention becomes unavoidable. 
However, some Chinese villages are still less vulnerable to the aforementioned 
problems than their neighbours. Despite the lack of trustworthy formal institutions for 
information exchange, citizens may still consider the signals and messages from the 
authoritarian state as credible if they personally believe in the political figures around 
them (Fewsmith 2001; Gibson 2001). In rural China, local cadres are the political 
figures who have the closest relations with villagers (Tao and Liu 2013). Therefore, if 
a religious group can facilitate credible communications between local cadres and 
villagers, it has a better chance of preventing everyday grievances and conflicts from 
fermenting into collective contention. 
Bridging Religious Groups with Secular Social Forces 
Religious groups are widely regarded as important sources, containers, and maintainers 
of trust among their members (e.g. Smidt 1999; Veenstra 2002; Wuthnow 2002; Welch 
et al. 2004). However, the mutual trust felt among religious group members is not 
necessarily extendable to the rest of the local community (Larsen et al. 2004). As a 
result, not every religious group is willing and able to serve as the communication 
channel between cadres and villagers, and the roles played by religious groups in 
contentious politics may thus vary. 
To better understand this difference, we first look at Stream East (SE) and Stream 
West (SW), two adjacent villages in Southeast China. The two villages are separated by 
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a narrow stream and were in fact artificially divided from the same settlement in the 
1950s for purely administrative purposes. Thanks to their close location and shared 
history, SE and SW are very similar in cultural, historical, demographical, economic, 
and general policy terms. There is a temple in each village, which is the focal point of 
the only religious group. Both temples worship the same deity and each is managed by 
a board consisting of a dozen villagers. Cadres in both villages regularly participate in 
the collective ceremonies and public projects organised by the local temple. Yet the two 
temples behaved very differently after similar policy decisions made by the two village 
authorities in the late 1990s, when cadres in both SE and SW launched ambitious 
projects to covert public lands into industrial zones. 
Both aiming at ‘making the villagers rich’, the industrial zone projects in SE and 
SW started at almost the same time. However, the project in SE soon reached a 
premature end due to frequent collective contention, whereas the project in SW was 
highly successful. Today, while SE is often descripted by locals as ‘poor and chaotic’, 
SW has become one of the richest villages in the county thanks to its industrial zone. 
However, things were not so promising for SE at the beginning: as well as their 
colleagues in SE, cadres in SW were also accused by some villagers of being arbitrary 
and fractious. Luckily, thanks to the mediation of the temple, villagers in SW eventually 
came to believe that they could benefit from the industrial zone. They accepted the 
decision of their cadres without launching any collective protest, and many even 
voluntarily moved the graves of their ancestors to clear the fields for the industrial zone. 
While the temple in SE also has a close relationship with local cadres, it failed to deal 
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with the emerging divergence between the cadres and some villagers as to whether or 
not the public land should be converted into an industrial zone. Without credible 
negotiations between the two parties, rumours soon spread that the project was simply 
taking place in order for cadres to embezzle public money. Even though the official 
investigation from the township government found no evidence of corruption or 
maleficence, villagers in SE nonetheless launched several collective protests against the 
industrial zone project and eventually forced their village authority to withdraw the plan. 
However, few villagers in SE today seem not to envy what their neighbours have 
achieved. 
The two temples are very similar in religious belief and organisational structure. 
Why, then, was only the one in SW able to successfully mediate in the conflict between 
cadres and villages? The answer to this puzzle, I suggest, lies in the relationship 
between religious groups and secular social organisations: the head of SW’s Elderly 
Citizens Association – a vibrant secular social organisation – also sits on the temple 
board, whereas the temple in SE is completely isolated from any secular social 
organisation. The overlap with the secular Elderly Citizens Association enables the 
temple in SW to approach a wider public beyond its own boundaries, and it also reduces 
the temple’s political sensitivity by allowing it to put forward its agendas through the 
overlapping secular social organisation. On the other hand, without the cover of secular 
social organisations, temple leaders in SE were afraid that becoming involved in a 
source of contention between cadres and villagers might entail trouble for them, given 
that the government is highly suspicious of the influence of religious groups in the 
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secular domain. Moreover, without the assistance of secular social organisations, the 
temple in SE was hardly able to reach out to those villagers who do not share the 
religious faith of the group. 
The difference between the temples in SE and SW reveals the importance of the 
relationship between religious groups and secular social organisations. Overlapping 
membership domains with secular social organisations such as elderly citizens 
associations, folk culture societies and local dancing groups, as demonstrated by the 
case of SW, allows religious groups in rural China to extend their influence to a wider 
public despite the hostile political environment. Religious groups that overlap with 
secular social organisations are, therefore, more likely to have vigorous interactions 
with other groups and individuals in the local community. As a result, they have a better 
chance of meaningful involvement in secular affairs, including mediating in conflicts 
between local cadres and discontented villagers. Moreover, religious groups that 
overlap with secular social organisations have a better chance of acting as ‘nodes’ in 
the local nexus of power and governance. Existing research has confirmed that social 
stability and good governance are often associated with strong cooperation and efficient 
coordination between different social organisations, which could integrate divergent 
opinions, foster consensuses, gestate general social trust, and discourage ‘Jacobinical’ 
populist mobilisation by increasing mutual understanding among different social actors  
(Stone 2003; Tocqueville 2000; Kornhauser 1959; Fukuyama 1995). In other words, 
when religious groups overlap with secular social organisations, they bridge 
hierarchical and horizontal social relations, thus fitting their members into the 
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‘structural holes’ of local interpersonal networks (Burt 1992). In so doing, such 
religious groups can simultaneously exchange information and resources with multiple 
networks, and they are thus more capable of facilitating credible negotiations between 
different actors in the local community. 
It should be underlined that a religious group needs to overlap with secular social 
organisations rather than other religious groups in order to increase its chances of 
proactive engagement with local public affairs. The reason for this lies in the country’s 
strict religious restrictions. Religious groups remain politically sensitive in China today. 
A considerable proportion, if not the vast majority, of Chinese rural religious groups are 
not registered with the government, either because they are unwilling or not allowed to 
do so or simply because their beliefs do not fit into the five official religions. In order 
to survive and grow in such a hostile environment, religious groups without connections 
with secular social organisations have to deliberately distance themselves from 
sensitive issues like contentious politics so as to avoid unnecessary attention and 
possible suppression by the state. Overlapping with other religious groups could not 
reduce, and may even increase, the suspicions of the government. Therefore, only 
religious groups overlapping with secular social organisations can push their agendas 
through secular partners and engage with public affairs without significantly arousing 
the suspicions of the government. 
Linking Religious Groups to Local Authorities 
Overlapping with secular social organisations allows some religious groups to better 
engage with contentious politics; however, such a feature along cannot guarantee that 
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these groups will always successfully mediate rather than intensify contention. Thanks 
to their close relationship with secular social organisations, religious groups 
overlapping with secular social organisations are more capable to launch collective 
protests as well as to mediate in conflicts. Clearly, there is another factor that serves to 
differentiate religious groups that are effective in preventing collective contention from 
others. 
To identify this factor, we look at the temples in another pair of villages not far 
from SE and SW. Grand Rock (GR) and Little Rock (LR) are two villages separated by 
a narrow street. As was the case with SE and SW, GR and LR had been one settlement 
until the recent separation for administrative purposes. Their close geographical 
location and common history make GR and LR highly similar in their cultural, 
historical and demographic backgrounds, and the economic and general policy 
situations are also highly similar in the two villages today. Moreover, the village 
temples in GR and LR worship the same deity, have similar organisational structures, 
and overlap with the local Elderly Citizens’ Association. However, the temple in LR 
includes local cadres as members and hence overlaps with the village authority – this 
difference led to the different roles played by the two temples in the same contentious 
episode. 
In 2010, GR and LR almost simultaneously received an order to construct fire 
barriers in their public woods from the County Fire Department, and both villages had 
to rise funding for this from among their villagers. Many residents in both villagers 
became quite unhappy. They regarded the order as unreasonable and unfair, and some 
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even planned to protest against the Fire Department, hoping to force the latter either to 
withdraw its order or to provide sufficient funding for the construction. The temple in 
GR became a keen organiser of protests. Under the cover of the overlapping Elderly 
Citizens Association, it not only called for its members to resist the order but also tried 
to blockade the woods when the village authority sent a team to clear the site for the 
fire barriers. The order from the Fire Department was interpreted as a conspiracy in 
which village cadres would spend public money in exchange for personal benefits or 
opportunities. The protests caused significant trouble for the village cadres, and GR 
was heavily fined for not finishing the fire barriers on time. The order from the Fire 
Department remains the same as when I visited GR in 2012. The village authority had 
to borrow money to pay for both the fire barriers and the fines. Rumours spread that 
village cadres embezzled many of the construction funds, and collective protests 
became a constant issue in GR.  
The situation in LR, however, was quite different. A trustee of the village’s 
Elderly Citizens Association came up with an innovative idea to solve the problem. 
Instead of resisting the order to build fire barriers, he proposed the building of a walking 
trail that could serve as both a fire barrier and a footpath. Such a project, obviously, 
requires much more funding, and the temple in LR played a vital role in persuading 
villagers to support it. Thanks to the members who also hold positions in the village 
authority and the Elderly Citizens Association, the temple board firmly stated that its 
followers and other villagers would benefit from the project, and it thus mobilised 
believers to donate to the project and framed the donation as a virtuous action. In 
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addition, through the Elderly Citizens Association, it also persuaded other villagers, 
including some Christians, to support the project. Moreover, the temple, in tandem with 
the Elderly Citizens Association, supervised the process and the accounts of the project, 
making sure that no donation was misused. At the time of my visit in 2012, although 
the walking trail in LR was yet to be completed, it was already attracting more than 200 
visitors during each weekend. Villagers in LR are proud of the project. Many seemed 
to have completely forgotten how unpopular the order to build fire barriers had been in 
the first place. 
Thus, the temples in GR and LR, albeit highly similar in many ways, reacted to 
the same exogenous shock in completely different ways. Such a phenomenon highlights 
the importance of the relationship between religious groups and local authorities. 
Religious groups in China overlap with local authorities when they include incumbent 
or retired cadres as members. As in the case of LR, despite the strict religious 
restrictions in the country, it is possible for incumbent or retired Chinese township and 
village cadres to become religious group members in some parts of the country. These 
cadres play important roles in creating mutual understanding between the religious 
groups to which they belong and the local governments for which they work. Thanks 
to the dual memberships held by these incumbent or retired local cadres, religious 
groups with a membership that overlaps with the local authorities’ membership are 
more likely to serve as creditable negotiation channels between the state and society.  
In villages with religious groups that overlap with the local authority then, trivial 
conflicts between the state and society are far less likely to grow into collective 
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contention for several reasons. First, thanks to incumbent and retired cadres who 
simultaneously occupy positions in local authorities and religious groups, local 
authorities and ordinary villagers have a better chance of communicating with each 
other, and both parties are more likely to regard the information and signals from each 
other as credible. As a result, both local authorities and ordinary villagers can better 
understand the actual demands and true position from the other side, and therefore enjoy 
a better chance of reaching compromises and agreements before getting trapped in 
collective contention, which is usually a lose/lose outcome in the context of China.8 
Moreover, the existing literature also suggests that collective contention in 
contemporary China is often triggered by rumours, many of which have later been 
proven heavily exaggerated or simply untrue (Liu et al. 2010). Such rumours, however, 
are less likely to spread in villages such as LR, where residents can efficiently 
communicate with cadres thanks to the credible channels provided by religious groups 
overlapping with local authorities. 
A New Framework 
The foregoing comparisons suggest important lessons for better understanding the roles 
played by religious groups in contentious politics in authoritarian countries such as 
China. The different actions taken by similar religious groups during similar episodes 
of contention in two pairs of adjacent villages remind us of two issues that are often 
side-lined, if not completely neglected, in the existing theories. First, it seems more 
reasonable to consider the relationship between religious groups and collective 
contention as diverse rather than as uniform. Second, instead of assuming that such a 
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relationship is simply determined by the stance of religious groups, it seems more 
reasonable to also look at other important actors in local communities. 
Prior research has shown that political trust in authoritarian countries often exists 
in terms of multiple layers and in various dimensions, and citizens in authoritarian 
countries often trust the central government more than local cadres (Li 2008, 2013). 
While the mismatch of political trust in rural China provides some ‘breathing space’ for 
the central government because ‘dissatisfaction with lower levels does not immediately 
generate demands for fundamental political reforms’ (Li 2004), it also highlights that 
the key to preventing trivial conflicts from growing into collective contention is the 
mutual understanding between local cadres and ordinary citizens. Religious groups, as 
many have observed, have strong potential to bridge different local social forces and to 
link them with the state (e.g. Hillman 2004; Chau 2005). However, like the temples in 
SE and GR, not every religious group is able to be accepted by both villagers and cadres 
as credible communication channels. To make full sense of religious groups’ roles in 
contentious politics, I suggest that we need to take their relational status into 
consideration. First, when religious groups overlap with secular social organisations, 
they can better reduce political sensitivities and reach a wider public by presenting 
agendas through their secular partners. As a result, religious groups overlapping with 
secular social organisations are more likely to get involved in public affairs and have a 
positive impact in terms of reducing the likelihood of collective contention. Moreover, 
among religious groups that overlap with secular social organisations, those that also 
overlap with local authorities (i.e. that include incumbent or retired cadres as group 
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members) are more capable to be able to reduce the likelihood of collective contention, 
because these groups are more likely to be trusted by both ordinary villagers and local 
officials and hence have a better chance of serving as negotiating channels between the 
state and society. 
Figure 1 is here. 
Figure 1 illustrates the new explanatory framework. Drawing on the two criteria 
highlighted in the figure, we can categorise religious groups into four groups: Type 1 
groups overlap with secular social organisations but are isolated from local authorities; 
Type 2 groups are isolated from both secular social organisations and local authorities; 
Type 3 groups overlap with local authorities but are isolated from secular social 
organisations; and Type 4 groups simultaneously overlap with both secular social 
organisations and local authorities. The descriptive statistics of the four types of 
religious groups are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3 is here. 
As illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 3, among the four types of religious groups, 
only Type 4 groups are capable in facilitating credible communications between 
different actors in the local community and hence reduce collective contention. 
Therefore, collective contention should be less likely to occur in villages with more 
Type 4 groups, whereas other religious groups should have no significant impact on the 
occurrence of collective contention. This argument gives rise to the following testable 
hypothesis: Other things being equal, the likelihood of collective protest significantly 
correlates with the frequency of Type 4 religious groups but does NOT significantly 
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correlate with the frequencies of Types 1, 2 and 3 religious groups, respectively 
[Hypothesis 3].  
IfCP i=α+NT1iψ1+NT2iψ2+NT3iψ3+NT4iψ4+CViγ+TDiθ+μi [B] 
Hypothesis 3 is tested through Model B, which includes four independent 
variables: NT1, NT2, NT3, and NT4 refer to the frequencies of Type 1, Type 2, Type 3 
and Type 4 religious groups in a sample village, respectively. ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, and ψ4 are 
their coefficients, respectively. The meaning of the other symbols is the same as those 
explained earlier in relation to Model A. 
Table 4 is here. 
The statistical results of Model B are reported in Table 4, which shows that, 
among the four independent variables, only the coefficient of NT4 is significantly 
negative. In other words, while collective contention is less likely to occur in villages 
with more Type 4 religious groups, the frequency of other types of religious groups in 
a sample village does not have a significant impact on the occurrence of collective 
contention. That is to say, the results in Table 3 fully confirm the new explanatory 
framework illustrated by Figure 1. 
It is worth noting that some recent studies have also implied that the roles of 
religious groups in local politics may vary or change over time. Trejo (2009), for 
example, finds that Catholic clergy in Latin America were traditionally in favour of the 
status quo but became major institutional promoters of rural indigenous causes when 
‘confronted by the expansion of U.S. mainline Protestantism’. Tsai (Tsai 2007), in 
addition, finds that temples are more likely to push local cadres to provide public goods 
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in Chinese villages than churches are. Therefore, the occurrence of collective 
contention might possibly vary between villages with different levels of religious 
competition or between those with groups practising different religious faiths. However, 
neither alternative hypothesis holds when tested against the same data set used to 
validate the new explanatory framework. In other words, the key factor that 
differentiates the religious groups that can influence collective contention from those 
that cannot is indeed the relational status of these groups rather than the competition 
they face or the faith they have.9 
 
Conclusion 
This paper systematically examines the roles played by Chinese rural religious groups 
in contentious politics. According to the empirical findings, collective contention is less 
likely to occur in villages with a higher number of religious groups that simultaneously 
overlap with secular social organisations and local authorities, while other types of 
religious groups have no significant impact on the occurrence of collective contention. 
That is to say, at least in rural China, the relationship between religious groups and 
collective contention is multifaceted, and this relationship is determined not only by 
religious groups but also by their relations with other important actors in local 
communities, particularly secular social organisations and local authorities. 
These findings invite us to reflect on the ongoing debate on the roles of religious 
groups in contentious politics. Given that religious groups may act as both social 
agitators and tranquilisers, each of the competing theories seems to have captured 
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certain aspects of the relationship between religious groups and collective contention. 
However, to make better sense of such a relationship, we need to understand the factors 
that differentiate the roles of different religious groups in contentious politics, 
especially the political settings of, and the important actors in, local communities. For 
students of Chinese politics, this paper confirms that the variation in local cadres’ social 
relations and everyday actions may lead to different state/society relations in Chinese 
villages despite the apparently powerful party-state machine (e.g. Tsai 2007; O'Brien 
and Li 1999). It also suggests that social groups with different relational statuses may 
take up different attitudes and actions vis-à-vis the state. 
In practical terms, this paper suggests that the Chinese government would benefit 
from more flexible and sophisticated policies towards religious affairs. The current 
coercive policy is failing to stop the rapid development of religious groups. Moreover, 
it will probably undermine the local state/religion relationship in the long run and may 
eventually become a cause of contention. Indeed, homogeneous suppression of 
religious activities may unintentionally force religious groups with different faiths and 
practices to unite into a powerful oppositional social force. Therefore, to better maintain 
social stability, the party-state may want to adopt different policies to manage its 
relationship with different religious groups. Finally, lifting the ban on religious 
believers joining the ruling party would offer the authoritarian regime the chance of 
more informal but credible communications with citizens, and hence make it better able 
to prevent trivial conflicts from developing into collective contention.
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1   Background Information of the Sampled Villages 
Variables 
Possible Direction of Impact on the 
Dependent Variable (The Occurrence of 
Collective Contention) Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimal 
Value 
Maximal 
Value 
Village population positive 1580.05 1008.03 145 5082 
Frequency of 
Settlements mixed 5.00 8.01 1 60 
Village 
government 
revenue (1000 
yuan) mixed 27.35 164.25 -81 1650 
Total villagers’ 
income (1000 
yuan) mixed 7009.09 6944.36 39 44005 
Frequency of 
Party members negative 38.13 21.17 10 116 
Subsidy 
percentage in 
cadres’ salary mixed 82.63 29.58 0 100 
Possibility of 
promotion mixed 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Score on the 
Election Fairness 
Index negative 7.45 1.68 2 10 
Households 
influenced by land 
requisition positive 64.470 146.54 0 820 
Frequency of land 
requisition positive 0.82 1.17 0 5 
 N = 119. 
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Table 2   Statistical Results for Model A 
 
 
Variables 
Model [A] 
The Occurrence of Collective Contention 
Independent variable  
Frequency of religious groups  
 
0.0088 
(0.28) 
Control variables  
Village population -0.0002* 
 (-1.74) 
Frequency of Settlements 0.0121 
 (1.19) 
Village government revenue (1000 yuan) 0.5700 
(1.62) 
Total villagers’ income (1000 yuan) 0.0000 
(0.24) 
Frequency of Party members 0.0043 
 (0.73) 
Subsidy percentage in cadres’ salary 0.0077** 
(2.35) 
Possibility of promotion 0.0663 
 (0.48) 
Score on the Election Fairness Index -0.0299 
(-0.94) 
  Households influenced by land requisition 0.0006 
(1.40) 
Frequency of land requisition 0.1180* 
 (1.89) 
Township-level dummies controlled 
Constant -0.4330 
 (-1.20) 
R2 0. 7041 
N=119. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 
5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
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  Dimension I 
 
Dimension II 
 Does the religious group overlap with a secular social 
group (e.g. elderly citizens associations, folk culture 
groups, etc.)? 
  No Yes 
Does the religious 
group overlap 
with a local 
authority? 
No 
Type 2 
should NOT be 
significantly correlated 
with the occurrence of 
collective contention 
Type 1 
should NOT be 
significantly correlated 
with the occurrence of 
collective contention 
Yes 
Type 3 
should NOT be 
significantly correlated 
with the occurrence of 
collective contention 
Type 4 
should be NEGATIVELY 
correlated with the 
occurrence of collective 
contention 
 
Figure 1   A New Explanatory Framework on the Relationship between 
Religious Groups and Collective Contention in Rural China 
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Table 3   Descriptive Statistics on the Four Types of Religious Groups 
 
  Type 1 
Groups 
Type 2 
Groups 
Type 3 
Groups 
Type 4 
Groups 
Classification Dimensions     
 Overlap with secular social organisations Yes No No Yes 
 Overlap with local authorities No Yes No Yes 
Expected Impacts     
 Prevent collective contention No No No Yes 
Basic Information     
 Total frequency 25 15 65 16 
 Percentage of certain type of groups in 
all religious groups 
20.66 12.40 53.72 13.22 
 Average frequency in each village 0.21 0.13 0.55 0.13 
 Frequency of villages with certain type 
of groups 
15 5 41 10 
 Percentage of villages with certain type 
of groups in all sampling villages 
12.61 4.20 34.45 8.40 
 Percentage of villages with certain type 
of groups in villages that have at least 
one religious group 
23.08 7.69 63.08 15.38 
 Maximal frequency in a village 6 8 9 3 
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Table 4   Statistical Results for Model B 
  
Model 
Variables 
[B] 
The Occurrence of Collective Contention 
Independent variable  
Frequency of Type 1 groups -0.0216 
(-0.16) 
Frequency of Type 2 groups 0.0206 
(0.63) 
  Frequency of Type 3 groups 0.0714 
(0.30) 
  Frequency of Type 4 groups 
 
-0.1762** 
(-2.14) 
Control variables  
  Village population -0.0002 
 (-1.22) 
  Frequency of Settlements 0.0052 
 (0.53) 
  Village government revenue (1000 yuan) 0.6355* 
(1.84) 
  Total villagers’ income (1000 yuan) 0.0000 
(0.20) 
  Frequency of Party members 0.0062 
 (0.98) 
  Subsidy percentage in cadres’ salary 0.0095** 
(2.61) 
  Possibility of promotion 0.0169 
 (0.12) 
  Score on the Election Fairness Index -0.0336 
(-1.00) 
  Households influenced by land requisition 0.0007 
(1.68) 
  Frequency of land requisition 0.1383** 
 (2.16) 
  Township-level dummies controlled 
Constant -0.5080 
 (-1.30) 
R2 0.7226 
N=119. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented 
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
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Notes 
1 Please refer to the online appendix for more detailed information on the sampling and 
data collection strategies. 
2 Logistic or probit models are normally recommended for binary dependent variables, 
thanks to their better capability in value predicting (Gessner et al. 1988). However, 
models in this paper each include a large number of dummy variables, which would 
inevitably lead to the omission of a large number of cases if logistic or probit models 
were to be applied. Moreover, OLS models are as efficient as the logistic and probit 
models in testing the significance and direction of the coefficient of the dependent 
variable based on existing data. Given that the purpose of my regression models is not 
to predict future collective contention but to test whether religious groups actually had 
an impact on pre-existing examples of contention, OLS models are adopted so as to 
keep as many sample villages as possible and avoid unnecessary complexity. 
3 The threshold scale is set consistently with prior research on collective contention in 
contemporary China, such as, for example, Chen (2012). 
4 Please refer to the online appendix for more detailed information on the rationales to 
control these variables. 
5 None of the episodes of collective contention in my dataset were directly triggered by 
religious issues. This is consistent with the existing body of research, which shows that 
religious groups may pay an enormous price for challenging the ruling order in 
authoritarian countries such as contemporary China (Tong 2009; Yang 2006). 
6 This, however, does not mean that democracies are always free from collective 
contention. On the contrary, when the grievances of certain social groups cannot be 
channelled out through formal institutions, collective violence may be triggered by 
trivial incidents. A famous recent example is the 2011 London riots. 
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7 ‘Rightful resistance’ refers to ‘popular contention that (1) operates near the boundary 
of an authorized channel, (2) employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to 
curb political or economic power, and (3) hinges on locating and exploiting divisions 
among the powerful’ (O'Brien 1996). 
8 To local officials, collective protests in their jurisdiction may lead to intervention and 
punishment from higher-level governments, especially in cases wherein they fail to 
cope with these protests. Protesters may face serious repression from local governments. 
For example, according to Cai’s (2008) survey of 78 collective protests, only 20 cases 
were solved after a collective protest, with the other 58 cases being either repressed or 
ignored. Furthermore, in 10 of the solved cases, although citizens’ demands were met, 
some or all of the participants were punished. For more detailed and comprehensive 
discussions on the possible consequences of collective protests, see also Cai (2010) and 
Chen (2012). 
9 Due to the limited space, please refer to the online appendix for detailed models and 
results. 
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